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Summary
This report provides an overview of federal government corporations, a category
currently consisting of some 18 corporate agencies performing functions assigned to
them in law.  A government corporation, as defined in this report, is an agency of
government, established by Congress to provide a market-oriented public service and
intended to produce revenues that meet or approximate its expenditures.
Corporations cover the spectrum in size and function from large, well-known entities,
such as the U.S. Postal Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to
small, low-visibility corporate bodies, such as the Federal Financing Bank in the
Department of the Treasury and Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) in the
Department of Justice.
Although no two government corporations are entirely alike, there are sufficient
commonalities to make possible generalizations about their authorities, organization,
mission, and depository practices.  This said, it is also noted in the report that the
dominant thrust in recent years with respect to regular executive agencies and
corporations has been toward autonomy and disaggregation.  Most proposed
corporations, for instance, call for independent status outside the departmental
structure, and in some instances outside the executive branch altogether. 
Special attention is given to the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945
(GCCA), as amended.  The Control Act is not a general incorporation act as is in
effect in the states.  The charter for each federal government corporation is the
separate legislation passed by Congress, thus permitting wide variance in legal and
organizational structure.  What the Control Act does, however, is provide for
standardized budget, auditing, debt management, and depository practices for those
corporations listed in the act.
Within the executive branch, there is little central management agency oversight
or supervision of government corporations as a class of agency.  Congress, at present,
does not conduct comprehensive management oversight of government corporations
by a single committee, preferring instead that oversight be performed by subject-field
committees on a corporate-specific basis.
The need for the executive branch and Congress to develop new organizational
structures that take into account both the public law requirements of governmental
status, and the flexibility that properly accompanies corporate bodies dependent upon
revenues for services, will probably increase, rather than diminish, thereby ensuring
the continuing attraction of the government corporation option.
This report will be updated annually.
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There is continuing interest in Congress, the executive branch, and the scholarly
community in a class of entities known collectively as government corporations.1 
The first question to raise respecting this continuing interest is: What is a federal
government corporation, or, more precisely, what are the essential characteristics of
a government corporation?  
As defined in this report, a government corporation is an agency of government,
established by Congress to perform a public purpose, which provides a market-
oriented product or service and is intended to produce revenue that meets or
approximates its expenditures.  By this definition, there are 18 entities that are
government corporations.2  
The U.S. Code does not provide a single definition of the term “government
corporation.”  Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines “government corporation” as “a
corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States” (5 U.S.C.
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3 This definition holds only for “the purpose of this title,” i.e., Title 5 of the U.S. Code.
4 This definition, it must be noted, the law declares to be only “for the purpose of this
chapter,” i.e., chapter 91 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code.
5 The 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447, Div. K, Sec. 146) declared that the
National Veterans Business Development Corporation (NVBDC), thought by some to be a
government corporation, was “a private entity and is not an agency, instrumentality,
authority, entity, or establishment of the United States Government.”  On NVBDC as a
government corporation, see Office of the Legal Counsel, United States Department of
Justice, Memorandum for Jennifer Newstead, General Counsel, Office of Management and
Budget, March 19, 2004.   As page 6 of this report indicates, just because Congress has
declared NVBDC to be a government corporation does not necessarily make it one. 
6 In 1996, the board of directors of the Federal National Mortgage Association changed its
name to Fannie Mae, although the law still refers to the organization by its former name.
7 For a discussion of GSEs, consult CRS Report RS21663, Government-Sponsored
Enterprises: An Institutional Overview, by Kevin R. Kosar; and Thomas H. Stanton,
Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Mercantilist Companies in the Modern World
(Washington: AEI Press, 2002).   
103).3  Meanwhile, the Government Corporation Control Act ((GCCA) 31 U.S.C.
9101-10) states that the term “government corporation” means “a mixed-ownership
Government corporation and a wholly-owned government corporation.”  It then lists
25 entities as government corporations (31 U.S.C. 9101).4
In addition to the enumeration of corporations provided in the GCCA, there
have been several other listings of corporations available, each different and based
upon the definition employed by the compiler. Corporations cover the spectrum from
such large, well-known corporations as the United States Postal Service and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to such small, low-visibility corporate bodies
as the Federal Financing Bank in the Treasury Department and Federal Prison
Industries (UNICOR) in the Justice Department.
The number of federal corporations is in moderate flux.  New corporations are
added from time to time (e.g., National Veterans Business Development Corporation
in 1999), whereas others are dissolved and disestablished (e.g., Pennsylvania Avenue
Development Corporation in 1996 and National Veterans Business Development
Corporation in 2004).5
Government corporations should not be confused with other corporate
organizations with ties to the federal government, such as government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs).  A GSE (e.g., Fannie Mae)6 is a privately owned, federally
chartered financial institution with nationwide scope and lending powers that benefits
from an implicit federal guarantee to enhance its ability to borrow money.   GSEs are
important institutions worthy of separate analysis, but they are not discussed, except
in passing, in this report.7  Finally, there are corporate bodies that are part of the
growing “quasi government,” to use Harold Seidman’s phrase, where the legal and
political lines of accountability are both intentionally and unintentionally made
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11 For a discussion of how the Patuxent River Naval Air Station contracts out its services to
state governments and private organizations, including use of their Defense Department
aircraft, see Steve Vogel, “Pentagon Recruits New Business: Military Turns to Private
Enterprise to Help Pay Bills,” Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1998, p. B1.
12 The term “New Public Management” has gained currency in part through its use by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to refer to the literature,
propositions, and practices that promote the conceptual convergence of governmental and
private sector management.  OECD, Governance in Transition: Public Management
Reforms in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1995); Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of
Governance: Public Administration for 21st Century America (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002); Robert D. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability:
Performance and the New Public Management (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
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tenuous.8  In 1996, for instance, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) created
the United States Investigation Services Corporation as an employee stock-ownership
plan (ESOP), an entry into the quasi government category that has sparked debate
regarding its status and authority.9
Interest in the government corporation option, and variations on this theme, has
increased in recent years.10  Three factors contributing to this interest are worth
noting.  First, the restrictive character of the federal budget encourages agencies to
develop new sources of revenue (e.g., outsourcing services to the private sector and
to other agencies) and to attempt to avoid increasing outlays.11  Second, experience
suggests that it is politically easier for corporate bodies to be exempted by Congress
from general management law provisions (e.g., Freedom of Information Act,
personnel and compensation ceilings) than it is for traditional agencies.  Finally, the
corporate concept appears to many, correctly or otherwise,  to be supportive of the
“New Public Management” that emphasizes entrepreneurship, risk-taking, and
private sector practices in federal administration.12 
In a typical contemporary session of Congress, several bills are introduced to
establish government corporations.  These actions prompt questions as to their legal
character, their utility vis-a-vis traditional agencies, and their limitations as units of
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13 See, for example, Ronald C. Moe, “The Importance of Public Law: New and Old
Paradigms of Government Management,” in Phillip J. Cooper and Chester A. Newland, eds.
Handbook of Public Law and Administration  (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1997), pp. 41-57.
14 McCulloch v. Maryland (17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819)).  The Supreme Court’s ruling
implied that partial federal ownership of a corporation, in this instance the Bank of the
United States, assigned the corporation certain attributes normally reserved to the sovereign
authority (e.g., non-taxable status).  The Court also declared that the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18) permitted Congress to establish
corporations.  See also Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
15 Marshall Dimock, Government-Operated Enterprises in the Panama Canal Zone
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
16 Harold A. Van Dorn, Government Owned Corporations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1926).
17 John Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations in English-Speaking Countries
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937).
governmental institutions.  For example, the 109th Congress is considering bills that
would create a Louisiana Reconstruction Corporation (H.R. 4100 and S. 2172).  This
federal entity would engage in commercial-type transactions, such as purchasing and
selling property, in areas of Louisiana affected by Hurricane Katrina. 
A government corporation is not a panacea for contemporary public
management problems.  There are times when it may be an appropriate choice and
times when it may not.  Understanding the unique character of government
management, based as it is upon tenets of public law, provides guidance in weighing
these choices.13   
Evolution of the Federal Government Corporation
Historically, the federal government has been involved in few commercial
enterprises.  There were some early instances of the federal government participating
in otherwise private corporate enterprises on a shared ownership basis, most notably
the first and second Banks of the United States.  This practice came into question,
however, as a consequence of a Supreme Court ruling in 1819.14  From that time to
this, the federal government, with  few exceptions, has consciously avoided shared
ownership involvement with private, nongovernmental entities. 
The first time the federal government acquired a corporation outright occurred
in 1903, when the Panama Railroad Company was purchased from the French
Panama Canal Company.15  Since then, a number of corporate bodies have been
established as part of the federal government, with growth in that number tending to
come in spurts and generally in response to emergencies.  The first large-scale use of
the corporate option accompanied the mobilization for World War I.16  Later, the
Depression of the 1930s fostered numerous corporations (e.g., the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and Tennessee Valley Authority).17  Finally, World War II
prompted additional federal corporations.  After the passing of each of these
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18 CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, Clinton C. Brass,
Coordinator.
19 The Supreme Court opinion in the 1946 case of Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States (327
U.S. 536) held that government corporations are agencies of the United States.  “That the
Congress chose to call it [Reconstruction Finance Corporation] a corporation does not alter
its character so as to make it something other than what it actually is, an agency selected by
the Government to accomplish purely governmental purposes.”
20 In a 1988 report the GAO profiled some 44 government corporations. U.S. General
Accounting Office, Profiles in Existing Government Corporations, GAO/AFMD-89-43FS
(Washington: GAO, 1988).   In 1995, using a more precise and narrow  definition, the GAO
concluded that there were actually 22 government corporations.  U.S. General Accounting
Office, Government Corporations: Profiles of Existing Corporations, GAO/GGD-96-14
(Washington: GAO, 1995).   Some years earlier, in 1981, the National Academy of Public
Administration issued a substantial report on government corporations and listed 39
corporations.  Report on Government Corporations, 2v. (Washington: National Academy
of Public Administration, 1981).  Finally, in a major  study of government corporations, A.
Michael Froomkin, using a somewhat eclectic definition, simply concluded that there were
“more than forty” government corporations.  “Reinventing the Government Corporation,”
University of Illinois Law Review, 1995, p. 549.
emergencies, many of the corporations that dealt with them were abolished or
absorbed into the permanent executive branch agencies.  
In 1945, partly in response to the proliferation of corporate bodies created for
the war effort, Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act.
Provisions of the act standardized budget, auditing, debt management, and depository
practices for corporations.  Notwithstanding unusual provisions that may be present
in their enabling statute, government corporations remain “agencies” of the United
States, and are therefore subject to all laws governing agencies, except where
exempted from coverage by provisions of general management laws,18 or by
provisions in the enabling act of the corporation.19
The GCCA is not a general incorporation act such as is in effect in the states.
The charter for each federal government corporation is the separate enabling
legislation passed by Congress.  The GCCA also does not offer a general definition
of what constitutes a government corporation.  It simply enumerates organizations
covered by the act.
In addition to the enumeration of corporations in the GCCA, there have been
several other listings of corporations available, each different and based upon the
definition employed by the compiler.20  The corporations cover the spectrum from
such large, well-known corporations as the United States Postal Service and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to such small, low-visibility corporate bodies
as the Federal Financing Bank and Federal Prison Industries.
In the absence of a general incorporation act with organizational definitions,
how is one to know when a government corporation is the most suitable option, and
what criteria should be met before a government corporation is established?
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21 U.S. Congress, House, Document No. 19, 80th  Congress, 2nd  session  (Washington: GPO,
1948), pp. M57-M62.  
22 Neither CPB or LSC are government corporations; the U.S. Code explicitly denies that
either is an agency or instrumentality of the federal government and neither are support
themselves through commercial transactions.  Both CPB and LSC are not-for-profit
corporations chartered under the laws of the District of Columbia (47 U.S.C. 396 and 42
U.S.C. 2996).  Of course, as the Lebron decision indicated, the Supreme Court, not
Congress, is the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not a government corporation. 
23 For further information on the legal status and laws on budgeting and finances of
government corporations, see General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Laws, Vol IV, pp. 17-119 - 17-216.
24 Ronald C. Moe and Robert S. Gilmour, “Rediscovering Principles of Public
Administration: The Neglected Foundation of Public Law,” Public Administration Review,
vol. 55, Mar./Apr. 1995, pp. 135-46.
In an effort to provide criteria to determine when the corporate option was
appropriate, President Harry Truman, in his 1948 budget message, stated:
Experience indicates that the corporate form of organization is peculiarly adapted
to the administration of government programs which are predominately of a
commercial character — those which are revenue producing, are at least
potentially self-sustaining and involve a large number of business-type
transactions with the public. In their business operations such programs require
greater flexibility than the customary type of appropriations budget ordinarily
permits.  As a rule, the usefulness of a corporation rests on its ability to deal with
the public in a manner employed by private enterprise for similar work.21
Congress, generally at the President’s behest, has created agencies titled
“corporations” that do not meet these criteria.  The Corporation for Public
Broadcasting and the Legal Services Corporation are examples of “corporations” that
do not perform commercial functions, although they receive incidental income from
advertising rates and legal fees.22  A principal intention behind assigning this status
and title was to provide considerable insulation from oversight by the central
management agencies and the application of the general management laws.
Characteristics of a Government Corporation
No two federal government corporations are completely alike.  There are
sufficient commonalities among the several corporations, however, that it is possible
to make some generalizations about their authorities, organization, mission, and
behavior.23
Legal Status
Government corporations, no matter what function they perform or how
“private” they may appear to the public or to themselves, are agents of the state
subject to constitutional limitations.24   As the Supreme Court concluded in the 1995
Lebron case,  a government corporation has certain inherent legal characteristics that
CRS-7
25 The Supreme Court in a 1995 case faced the issue of distinguishing between a
governmental and private corporation.  The National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(AMTRAK) established by Congress (45 U.S.C. 451), and enumerated as a “mixed-
ownership corporation” under 31 U.S.C. 9101, was sued by Michael Lebron for rejecting,
on political grounds, an advertising sign he had contracted with them to display.  Lebron
claimed that his First Amendment rights had been abridged by AMTRAK because it is a
government corporation, and therefore an agency of the United States.  AMTRAK argued,
on the other hand, that its legislation provides that it “will not be an agency or establishment
of the United States Government” and thus is not subject to constitutional provisions
governing freedom of speech.  The Court decided that, although Congress can determine
AMTRAK’s governmental status for purposes within Congress’s control (e.g., whether it
is subject to statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act), Congress cannot make the
final determination of AMTRAK’s status as a government entity for purposes of
determining constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions.  To do so, in the Court’s
view, would mean that the government could evade its most solemn constitutional
obligations by simply resorting to the corporate form of organization.  Michael A. Lebron
v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation; 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
AMTRAK continues to seek distance from the application of the general management
laws.  In the AMTRAK Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-134; 111 Stat.
2570), AMTRAK was removed from the list of mixed-ownership government corporations
in Title 31.  And in any year when AMTRAK receives no government subsidy, it will be
exempt from coverage under the Inspector General Act of 1978.
26 Robert S. Gilmour and Laura S. Jensen, “Reinventing Government Accountability: Public
Function, Privatization and the Meaning of ‘State Action,’” Public Administration Review,
vol. 58, May/June 1998, pp. 247-58; Harold J. Sullivan, “Privatization of Public Services:
A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights,” Public Administration Review, vol. 47,
Nov./Dec. 1987, pp. 461-68; Ronald C. Moe, “Exploring the Limits of Privatization,” Public
Administration Review, vol. 47, November/December 1987, pp. 453-60.
27 28 U.S.C. 519: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall
supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party,
and shall direct all United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special
attorneys appointed under section 543 of this Title in the discharge of their respect duties.”
28 For a discussion of litigation authority being delegated to agencies, see U.S. Congress,
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cannot be shed simply by legislative language or by corporate fiat.25   The nature of
the function performed (e.g., managing a railroad) has no effect upon its
governmental character.  The governmental and private sectors are fundamentally
separate and distinct, with the distinctions based largely in legal theory, not economic
theory.26  This understanding is essential to recognizing both the potentialities and
limitations of the government corporate concept.  The government corporation
remains governmental in character until Congress determines it shall be fully private,
thereby coming under private law.
As a general proposition, the attorney general is vested with central control over
the litigation to which the U.S. government is a party.27  Various statutes recognize
that the attorney general is the chief legal officer for all departments and agencies.
However, in an uneven pattern over the years, exceptions have been permitted to this
central authority.  The independent regulatory commissions, for instance, have some
independence (although the degree of independence varies considerably from
commission to commission) in their litigation authority.28  While the Justice
CRS-8
28 (...continued)
Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Study on Federal Regulations, 5v.
(Washington: GPO, 1974), vol. 5 (Regulatory Organization), pp. 54-67;  U.S. Administrative
Conference of the United States, “Multi-Member Independent Regulatory Agencies: A
Preliminary Survey of Their Organization” (revised edition), May 21, 1990.  
29 The Federal Tort Claims Act defines federal agencies to include “the executive
departments, ... independent establishments of the United  States, and corporations (other
than contractors) primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States.” 28
U.S.C.A. 2671.
30 Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, 5th ed.,  p. 190.
Department has consistently favored central coordination of litigation, this view has
been difficult to maintain in practice. With the relatively small staff of the department
and its understandable reluctance to become responsible for routine litigation, there
has been a trend toward awarding greater authority and flexibility to the departments
and agencies in their legal affairs.
With respect to government corporations, in their enabling legislation they are
typically assigned a legal personality distinct from that of the United States.  Most
are subject to, and may initiate, civil suits.  Government corporations, being agencies
of the United States, have their employees come under the limited waiver of
immunity provided in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).29
Distinguished public administrator Harold Seidman notes: “As a body corporate,
a government corporation has a separate legal personality distinct from that of the
United States.  A corporation, therefore, does not enjoy the traditional immunity of
the United States from being sued without its consent.”  Further, a corporation is
generally provided authority “to determine the character and the necessity for its
expenditures, and the manner in which they shall be incurred, allowed and paid.”
Corporations can generally borrow funds through the Federal Financing Bank of the
Treasury Department, one advantage of this practice being “that such unguaranteed
corporate obligations are not included under the public debt ceiling.”30
In practical terms, the purpose of permitting corporations to sue and be sued in
their own name is to enable a private business to contract with a government
corporation under the assurance that if something goes amiss, it can go to court to
settle the matter.  With a regular government agency, however, a contractual dispute
must normally go through a laborious process in the Court of Claims; if the
contractor wins, he must wait for an appropriation; the Departments of Justice and
Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, the President, and both houses of
Congress may become involved in the claim.  With the government corporation,
however, this process is simplified, and when a contractor prevails, he can usually
obtain a prompt settlement.
Budget and Finance
The budget process is a useful management tool for planning as well as for
maintaining accountability.  Presidents and central management agencies find the
discipline of the budget an essential element in their management arsenal.  Regular
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agencies of the executive branch, with few exceptions, are subject to uniform rules
and regulations with respect to the budgets.  Government corporations, on the other
hand, are exempt either individually or collectively from many executive branch
budgetary regulations.  These exemptions are predicated, for the most part, on the
idea that with the corporate structure, users, rather than the general taxpayer, are the
principal source of revenue, and that fluctuations in income and expenditures do not
impact in any material way the budget of the federal government.
The GCCA, as amended in 1982 (96 Stat. 1042), provides that each wholly
owned government corporation shall prepare and submit to the President a “business-
type budget” 
in a way and before a date the President prescribes by regulation for the budget
program.  This budget program shall contain estimates of the financial condition
and operation of the corporation for the current and following fiscal years and the
condition and results of operations of the last fiscal year.  Further, it shall contain
statements of financial condition, income and expense, and sources and uses of
money, an analysis of surplus and deficit, and additional statements and
information to make known the financial condition and operations of the
corporation, including estimates of operations by major activities, administrative
expenses, borrowings, the amount of U.S. Government capital that will be
returned to the Treasury during the fiscal year, and appropriations needed to
restore capital impairment.” (31 U.S.C. 9104)
The objective of the budget program is to permit the corporation sufficient financial
flexibility to carry out its activities.  The President, after review and revision, submits
these budget programs to Congress at the same time as the executive branch budget
is submitted.  Under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFOA),31 government
corporations must submit to Congress annual management reports, which are to
include statements of financial position, operations, and cash flows, a reconciliation
to the budget report of the government corporation (if applicable), and a statement
on internal accounting and administrative control systems.32
Many Members of Congress feel somewhat uneasy with broad, “business type
budgets,” also referred to as “budget programs.”  To be sure, Congress can alter these
budget programs and can limit the use of corporate funds for any purpose, but this
option is seldom employed.  Faced with complex projections and agencies with little
direct budgetary impact, Members understandably give corporate bodies marginal
attention, and when they do, it is directed to the “administrative expenses” line
account.  It is not clear what the term “administrative expenses” entails, but
corporations see it as including “entertainment expenses” and thus keep the latter to
the minimum. As a general assessment, the corporations come under comparatively
little congressional scrutiny, except when there is some political or financial threat
evident. As Seidman notes: “In essence, the business-type budget provides for a
qualitative rather than a quantitative review of proposed corporate expenses.”33
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35 31 U.S.C. 9105.
36 In 2004, P.L. 108-447, Div. C, Sec. 601 changed TVA’s three-member, full-time board
to a nine-member, part-time board.
37 Cabinet secretaries placed on corporate boards, or any boards for that matter, rarely attend
such meetings, sending subordinates instead to protect departmental interests.  For approval
of this process, see U.S. Department of Justice, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 257, Delegation
of Cabinet Members’ Functions as Ex-Officio Members of the Board of Directors of the
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Traditional agencies of the United States receive the preponderance of their
financial support from funds appropriated by Congress.  Government corporations,
on the other hand, generally receive most, if not all, their funds from users of their
services.  Thus, the latter relationship has a business character in which it is the
obligation of the corporate body to provide services as long as the buyers are willing
to pay.  This being the case, revenues, expenditures, and even personnel will tend to
fluctuate according to consumer demand.
Until 1975, GAO was responsible under the GCCA for performing annual
financial audits of government corporations.  At the request of GAO, the GCCA was
amended to provide for audits of the financial transactions of wholly owned
corporations at least once every three years, rather than annual audits.  In 1990, as
part of the CFOA,34 GAO’s recommendation that government corporations be subject
once again to annual audits was accepted.  Henceforth, however, the audit is to be
conducted by the corporation’s inspector general “or by an independent external
auditor, as determined by the inspector general or, if there is no inspector general, the
head of the corporation,” according to accepted government auditing standards.35
The Comptroller General, however, continues to be authorized to review any
corporate financial statement.
Location and Governance
The location, structure, and governance of government corporations varies
greatly.  Corporate status does not limit where in the executive structure a
corporation may be located.  Corporations may be located in executive departments
(e.g., the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation in the Department of
Transportation), or be assigned independent status (e.g., the Export-Import Bank).
A government corporation may be so structured that it is but a financial entity whose
employees are actually employees of the parent agency (e.g., the Federal Financing
Bank in the Department of the Treasury, and Commodity Credit Corporation in the
Department of Agriculture).
There is no one form of governance necessarily associated with government
corporations.  Whether a government corporation is best managed by a full-time
board (e.g., TVA, formerly),36 a chief executive officer selected by a part-time board
and responsible to it (e.g., Corporation for National and Community Service), a part-
time board consisting of Cabinet-level officials of other agencies (e.g., Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation),37 a mixed board of governmental and private
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Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank (1982).
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), an agency within the Department
of Labor, provides evidence of the problems that some analysts contend are associated with
boards of directors that include officials of other departments.  The board of directors of the
PBGC has three members: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and
as chairman, the Secretary of Labor.  “Such arrangements,” according to the National
Academy of Public Administration Report, “inherently cause confusion as to the
corporation’s status and the role of the Secretary of Labor.  To have Cabinet officers serve
as directors of a subordinate unit of an executive department other than their own, places
him and the head of that department in an anomalous position.  Can the Secretaries of the
Treasury and Commerce give orders to the Secretary of Labor?  On the other hand, are the
Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce, when acting as PBGC directors, in any way required
in formulating policies to conform to the policies of the Secretary of Labor?”  Perhaps
because of such anomalies, although the bylaws call for “regular meetings,” the board never
met between March 1982 and April 1991.  National Academy of Public Administration,
Study of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s Corporate Status (Washington:
NAPA, 1991), pp. 5-6.
38 Marshall E. Dimock, “Government Corporations: A Focus on Policy and Administration,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 43, Oct. 1949, pp. 914.
39 Harold Seidman, “The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation,” Public
Administration Review, vol. 12, spring 1952, pp. 93-111.
40 Ibid.
appointees (e.g., Overseas Private Investment Corporation), or a single administrator
responsible to a department secretary, and ultimately to the President (e.g.,
Government National Mortgage Association, “Ginnie Mae”), is an open question.
There are positives and negatives to the various options for corporate governance.
A board of directors is the trademark of a government corporation, according
to many lawmakers and attorneys.  Marshall Dimock, an academic writing in 1949,
argued that a board of directors was considered an essential element for an
“authentic” government corporation.  “Being a separate and distinct entity, headed
by its own board of directors, the corporation is inherently better able to succeed than
the ordinary department of government.”38  
A few years later, Harold Seidman challenged the view that a board of directors
was an essential and necessarily desirable element for a government corporation.
Dimock’s view, he asserted, was based on an inappropriate borrowing of state
practice by the federal government.  State incorporation laws require boards of
directors for private corporations to insure representation where ownership is held
by more than one party.  In government corporations, under this reasoning, because
ownership resides in the government  alone, there is no inherent need for a board of
directors.39  Government corporations, Seidman pointed out, have existed and
operated without boards of directors.  A board of directors may well be found
advisable and useful under some circumstances, but, Seidman said, it is not the sine
qua non of a government corporation.40
Whether or not a board of directors is essential or desirable for a government
corporation, the fact is that all but two federal government corporations presently
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42 See, for example, Alan Dean, Dwight Ink, and Harold Seidman, “OMB’s ‘M’ Fading
Away,” Government Executive, vol. 26, June 1994, pp. 62-64; Ronald C. Moe, “At Risk:
The President’s Role as Chief Manager,” in The Managerial Presidency, 2nd ed., ed. James
Pfiffner (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), pp. 265-84.
have boards of directors.  The two exceptions are the Government National Mortgage
Association (“Ginnie Mae”), and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation.  In a study published in 1981, the National Academy of Public
Administration was critical of boards of directors in general:
We believe that this arrangement, borrowed from the private corporation model,
has more drawbacks than advantages and that in most cases the governing board
would be better replaced by an advisory board and the corporation managed by
an administrator with full executive powers.  A governing board may cut or
confuse the normal lines of authority from the President or departmental
secretary to the corporation’s chief executive officer.  With an advisory board,
the secretary’s authority to give that officer policy instruction is clear, as is the
officer’s right to report directly to the secretary and to work out any exemptions
from or qualifications of administration or departmental policies and practices
which the corporation requires.41
There is little doubt that a board of directors, particularly a part-time,
“outsiders” board, is a “buffer” between the corporation’s top executive and political
officials, including the President.  Whether such a buffer is a desirable feature in the
overall administrative system, however, is a question subject to debate.  Notably, it
is also argued that corporation board appointments are patronage plums for the White
House since the jobs are not generally demanding.
The effectiveness and utility of boards is dependent upon a number of factors:
the coherency of the enabling legislation, the conceptual integrity and soundness of
the program itself, and the number and quality of membership. Large boards
(comprising more than 12 members), for instance, may experience difficulty in
making decisions.  The play of internal factors, such as the size of the board, the
primary loyalties of board members (whether to the corporation or to an outside
constituency group), and the relationship of the board to the corporate management
all also have their place in the managerial equation. 
Central Management Agency Oversight
There is, at present, little central management agency oversight or supervision
of government corporations as a category of agency in the executive branch.  Nor is
there any central unit charged with designing government corporations from the
perspective of presidential or central management interests.42  Government
corporations today are largely perceived as discrete entities, each with its own
political and administrative requirements, and each with its own route and degree of
political accountability.  Individual corporations come under scrutiny from time to
time by OMB and Congress, or more precisely, a congressional committee
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Bureau of the Budget (BOB), ceased to monitor government corporations and enterprises
during the 1960s.  Charles Bingman, speaking to a 1978 conference on public enterprises,
noted that he had been the last person in the BOB to undertake this monitoring role.  He
stated that he ceased the monitoring when it became apparent that the leadership of the
agency was no longer interested in this role.  In his view, both the executive branch and
Congress had effectively abandoned the intent of the GCCA.  Proceedings, Research
Conference in Public Enterprises, June 1, 1978 (Charlottesville, VA: Federal Executive
Institute, 1978), p. 18.
44 Letter dated May 24, 1994, from OMB Director Leon Panetta to Senators David Pryor and
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responsible for oversight.  More often than not, the immediate impetus for the
oversight follows from indications that a corporation is operating at financial risk or
there is an appearance of wrongdoing.
The current absence of systematic oversight of corporations as a class runs
counter to the intentions of the sponsors of the GCCA.  The Bureau of the Budget
(predecessor organization to the Office of Management and Budget) was instrumental
in the passage of the GCCA, and created a separate office to oversee the formation,
and monitor the operation, of government corporations on behalf of the President.
During the 1960s, this specialized staff function atrophied until at some point in the
1970s it is fair to conclude that there was little remaining central executive staff
capacity to provide information, expert advice, or oversight of government
corporations or to develop and implement consistent policies governing their
formation, authorities, and operations.43
Government corporations are not considered by OMB to be a category of
organization to be supervised collectively.  OMB, in support of its position, contends:
The responsibility for oversight of government corporations was not changed by
the OMB 2000 reorganization.  That is, government corporations will continue
to be reviewed by the Resource Management Office (RMO) which has
responsibility for the functional area most closely associated with the
corporation’s mission.... OMB does not review government corporations
separately from other government organizations that perform similar functions.44
The executive branch treatment of management responsibilities respecting
government corporations as a class of organization tends to place additional burdens
on Congress and its committees to determine if the corporations are respecting the
provisions of the general management laws (e.g., the National Environmental
Protection Act and the Competition in Contracting Act).  
One corollary of limited central management oversight of government
corporations is the lack of answers to fundamental issues regarding when and how
government corporations ought to be created and utilized.  There are at least two
schools of thought respecting the proper use of the government corporation option
relating to its structure, authority, and financial systems.  One school holds that
government corporations, including agencies called corporations but which do not
perform commercial activities, should be encouraged, provided maximum policy and
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46 National Academy of Public Administration, Conrail and the Uranium Enrichment
Corporation: A Comparison, by Alan Dean (Washington: NAPA, 1989), p. 5.
financial autonomy, and be subject to such oversight as is appropriate for other
agencies and instrumentalities in the same policy field.  The legal responsibilities of
the corporation should be located in its enabling statute.
The position of the second school is that government corporations should be
established only when appropriate criteria and standards, developed by a central
management agency, are met.  Such standards should be reflected in a national
incorporation law and apply to all proposed and functioning corporate bodies
properly defined.   Government corporations should be considered to be part of the
executive branch, but with recognition of their distinctive needs and oversight
requirements as a category of institutions.
Government Corporations as 
Transition Organizations
The government corporation concept may be considered  a useful alternative to
privatization of some agency, or it may be employed as a transition step toward
eventual full privatization.45  Our interest here is limited to the corporation as a
transition option.  The principal utility of the transitional government corporation is
that it can demonstrate marketability and asset value, critical elements in any
successful privatization venture.  
An early successful example of the government corporation concept as a
transition vehicle involved Conrail.  Conrail was created by Congress as a
government corporation in 1976 from the remnants of seven private, bankrupt
railroads.  It took some 10 years and an investment of $8 billion by the federal
government to bring Conrail up to industry standards before entertaining a reasonable
expectation that the railroad would be attractive to private investors.46   The federal
government received approximately $2 billion from the sale, but the real payoff was
that the northeastern region of the country was once again provided a viable freight
rail system.  The transition period as a government corporation was necessary to
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48 Peter Passell, “The Sticky Side of Privatization: Sale of U.S. Nuclear Fuel Plants Raises
Host of Conflicts,” New York Times, Aug. 31, 1997, p. 29.
49 Martha M. Hamilton, “Uranium Company Seeks Federal Aid: Privatized USEC Warns of
Losses,” Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1999, p. E8.
develop a record as a potentially profit-making venture prior to a successful
privatization (divestiture) effort.47  
More recently, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) has completed its
transitional process toward full privatization, with mixed results.  USEC, until 1993
a regular agency in the Department of Energy (DOE), operated uranium enrichment
plants in Kentucky and Ohio.  In the 1950s, the plants produced highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for defense purposes.  Times changed and the United States was
successfully challenged by new international entrants into the market.  Today, the
United States produces little more than one-third of the world’s enriched uranium,
much of it destined for private operations.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486; 106 Stat. 2776) established the
U.S. Enrichment Corporation as a wholly owned government corporation.  The
general intent of the legislation was to “privatize” the two plants and let them
compete in the world market.  A privatization plan was delivered by USEC to the
President and Congress in 1995.  The plan suggested that there were two primary
methods of corporate divestiture: an initial public offering (IPO) and a merger or
acquisition with another corporation or group of corporations.48  After considerable
discussion, the IPO option was selected, as it had been with Conrail.
The IPO of stock was completed on July 28, 1998, and raised an estimated $1.9
billion for the federal government.  The USEC transition process highlighted,
however, one of the perennial problems in privatization efforts.  Congress may intend
a corporation to be private, but it also may want the corporation to continue to be
involved in public policy implementation.  In this instance, Congress wanted the
corporation to participate in implementing a foreign policy objective, which was to
purchase at above market rates a substantial amount of Russian enriched uranium
otherwise destined for Russian weapons.  Under the HEU agreement, USEC receives
enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons and, in addition to its payment for
the material, returns an equivalent amount of natural (unenriched) uranium to Russia
to sell on the world market.  This arrangement, from the corporation’s perspective,
has not proven viable and in October 1999, the USEC solicited Congress for
“relief.”49
Another characteristic of a private corporation, legally organized and defined
as such, is the right to cancel a program or withdraw from an activity if it is not
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deemed in the fiduciary interests of the shareholders.  To the consternation of DOE
officials, such a decision was reached recently by the USEC board of directors.  One
of the assets transferred from the DOE to USEC in the divestiture was the right to
commercialize a new enrichment technology called “atomic vapor laser and isotope
separation” (AVLIS), a technology in which DOE had invested over $2 billion.  On
June 9, 1999, the board of directors of USEC determined that AVLIS was not
commercially viable and canceled the program.  The board’s decision made manifest
the fiduciary distinctions between a government and private corporation.50
The federal government may, for whatever reason, choose to directly divest
itself of a commercial activity or asset and not follow the transition corporation
option to establish its value in the market.  Although a transition corporation had
been recommended by an outside study,51 the Department of Energy determined to
directly divest itself of the California fields of the Elk Hills National Petroleum
Reserves.  The sale of the reserve in 1999 was to Occidental Petroleum for $3.65
billion.52
Conclusion
The government corporation form of federal agency is a useful option to
consider when establishing or reorganizing an agency with revenue potential.  It is
helpful to bear in mind, however, that there is no general provision in law that
defines what, precisely, government corporations are.  When writing the GCCA,
Congress and the executive branch simply viewed the various corporate bodies, and
defined them by enumeration, rather than by required characteristics. This relatively
unstructured approach has meant that some corporate bodies (e.g., U.S. Postal
Service) are not included in the GCCA enumeration, whereas other bodies, arguably
non-corporate in function and authority (e.g., Corporation for National and
Community Service) are listed.
There is little managerial oversight at present of government corporations as an
institutional category by either the President or Congress.  What oversight there is
tends to be corporation-specific.  In the case of Congress, corporations are assigned
to committees of subject-matter jurisdiction.  A GAO report recommended that
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corporations properly require both subject matter and management oversight, and that
the GCCA should be reconstituted to establish in law the characteristics of various
types of corporate bodies.53
Government corporations may be viewed as permanent agencies to perform a
continuing governmental function (e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); a
temporary agency (e.g., Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, Panama
Canal Commission); or a transition agency to facilitate the process whereby a
governmental agency or program is divested and transferred to the private sector
(e.g., U.S. Enrichment Corporation).  These options indicate the flexibility of the
government corporation concept and may provide models for extending the corporate
organization to other appropriations-funded agencies (e.g., U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and the U.S. Mint).  Both the latter agencies and their programs
meet the basic criteria for a government corporation and suggestions to this effect
have been made.
The future of government corporations as a category of federal organization
appears generally bright although they are not widely understood in executive
management circles.  The need for the executive branch and Congress to develop
new organizational structures that take into account both the public law requirements
of governmental status, and the flexibility that properly accompanies corporate
bodies dependent upon revenues for services will foreseeably increase rather than
diminish.54  The managerial quality of the law establishing a corporation, may be a
critical variable in determining the success or failure of that enterprise.  If the
conceptual basis of the law establishing a corporation or economic assumptions
therein are faulty, as was allegedly the case with the Synthetic Fuels Corporation in
the late 1970s, a government corporation may  become a liability to the executive
branch and face a short tenure.55  On the other hand, if a federal government
corporation is designed to conform with public law, governmental management
principles, and sound economics, as discussed earlier, a corporate agency may
provide a creative instrument to promote the public policy objectives of elected
officials. 
Although it has been the purpose of this report to emphasize the distinctive
characteristics of federal government corporations, it is important to conclude with
a statement of their shared characteristics with other federal agencies.  The mission
of both regular, appropriations-financed agencies and of government corporations is
the same, to implement the laws passed by Congress.
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Appendix 1. Federal Government Corporations
 1.  Commodity Credit Corporation (15 U.S.C. 714)
 2.  Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (12 U.S.C. 4703)
 3.  Export-Import Bank (12 U.S.C. 635)
 4.  Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (7 U.S.C. 1501)
 5.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (12 U.S.C. 1811)
 6.  Federal Financing Bank (12 U.S.C. 2281)
 7.  Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) (18 U.S.C. 4121)
 8.  Financing Corporation (12 U.S.C. 1441)
 9.  Government National Mortgage Corporation (12 U.S.C. 1717)
 10. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) (49 U.S.C. 241)
 11. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (22 U.S.C. 2191)
 12. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (29 U.S.C. 1301)
 13. Presidio Trust of San Francisco (16 U.S.C. 460bb)
 14. Rural Telephone Bank (7 U.S.C. 942)
 15. St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (33 U.S.C. 981)
 16. Tennessee Valley Authority (16 U.S.C. 831)
 17. U.S. Postal Service (39 U.S.C. 101)
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